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James E. Flemingt
We the People: Transformations.Bruce Ackerman. Harvard,
1998. Pp vii, 515.
INTRODUCTION: UNCONVENTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION

In his 1991 volume, We the People: Foundations,Bruce Ackerman urged us as Americans to declare our independence from
European models of government and to "look inward" to rediscover our distinctive constitutional scheme-dualist democracy.'
In his new volume, We the People: Transformations,he exhorts us
as dualist democrats to break up the monopoly that Article V of
the Constitution has held on our vision of constitutional amendment. He urges us to move "beyond Article V" and to embrace a
pluralist understanding of the sources of higher lawmaking
(pp 15-17). Only by doing so, he argues, will we be able to comprehend the processes of unconventional adaptation outside Article V whereby We the People have transformed the Constitution
through the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal. Nothing
less, Ackerman admonishes us, will preserve and realize both
"the possibility of popular sovereignty" (p 119) and "the possibility of interpretation" under our Constitution.2 Thus, if Foundations celebrated American exceptionalism from Europe-"We the
exceptional American People 3 -Transformations extols our unconventional adaptation and transformation of the Constitution
outside Article V-"We the unconventional American People."

t Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Ph.D. 1988, Princeton University; J.D. 1985, Harvard University; A.B. 1977, University of Missouri. I am grateful to
Mike Dorf, Martin Flaherty, Abner Greene, Nick Johnson, Linda McClain, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments on a draft of this essay, and to Sot Barber, Chris Eisgruber, Ned
Foley, Sandy Levinson, Frank Michelman, Larry Sager, and Bill Treanor for valuable discussions of Bruce Ackerman's constitutional theory. I benefited from presenting a draft at
a Fordham University School of Law Faculty Work-in-Progress Colloquium.
' Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations3-6, 32-33 (Harvard 1991).
2 Id at 131-62.
' See James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 Const Comm 355
(1994) (analyzing Ackerman's constitutional theory in light of the tradition of "American
exceptionalism" from European models).
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In the introduction to Transformations, Ackerman writes:
"There is lots of history in this book, some political science, a little philosophy-but these interdisciplinary excursions are in the
service of a fundamentally legal enterprise: ... If Americans of

the 1990's wish to revise their Constitution, what are the legal alternatives they may legitimately pursue?" (p 28). His formulation
is telling, because the strengths of this magnificent and important volume lie in its history, which is ingenious and fascinating,
and its political science, which is sophisticated and insightful, but
the shortcomings lie in its philosophy: its political, legal, and constitutional theory. As a matter of history and political science,
Ackerman provides among the best analyses ever offered of the
processes of constitutional transformation through the Founding
and Reconstruction, and the best analogies ever drawn between
those constitutional moments of higher lawmaking and the political transformation inaugurated by the New Deal. But as a matter
of philosophy, he fails to sustain his argument that the model of
transformation that he develops provides legal alternatives for
legitimate amendment of the Constitution outside Article V. The
"humanistic positivism" that he adumbrates to provide rules of
recognition of higher lawmaking (as distinguished from ordinary
lawmaking) (p 92) is not sufficient to establish that the New
Deal, by analogy to the Founding and Reconstruction, rises to the
level of a constitutional amendment.
After describing Transformations' theory of unconventional
constitutional change, I critique it in light of Ackerman's larger
project in the projected three volume We the People, focusing on
three of his pervasive claims or themes. First, despite Ackerman's
claim that his theory of dualist democracy entails his account of
transformation through unconventional adaptation, he elaborates
that account in a manner that practically levels or reduces his
dualism to a form of monism. Second, notwithstanding his suggestion that "the possibility of popular sovereignty" under our
Constitution depends upon our accepting his theory of transformation to supplement or even override Article V's formal
amending procedures, he has not developed a theory of popular
sovereignty that is adequate to underwrite his theory of transformation, much less the Constitution. Nor has he shown the impossibility of a dualist constitutional theory that both gives due
regard to popular sovereignty and views Article V as specifying
the exclusive procedures for amending the Constitution. Third,
despite Ackerman's claim that to preserve "the possibility of interpretation" of the Constitution- we must accept his contention
that the New Deal amended the Constitution, he has not put for-
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ward a theory of interpretation that can plausibly and elegantly
justify our basic liberties and many of the leading cases since
1937 in terms of the New Deal republic. Moreover, his development of the model of transformation, which emphasizes the discontinuity between the republics constituted by the Founding,
Reconstruction, and New Deal, may make it more difficult for
him to provide interpretations that achieve "intergenerational
synthesis" across republics in the projected third volume, We the
4
People: Interpretations.
Finally, in a concluding Section entitled "The Constitution
Goes to Yale,"' I reflect upon Ackerman's claims regarding "the
possibility of popular sovereignty" and "the possibility of interpretation." I basically turn those claims on their heads by asking:
How is it possible that Ackerman, who is Sterling Professor of
Law and Political Science at Yale and is undoubtedly in the pantheon of constitutional theorists, could believe it necessary to develop his theory of constitutional amendment and transformation
outside Article V in order to preserve and realize these possibilities? My speculation is that it must be because of something they
put in the drinking water in New Haven.6 I suggest that the root
difficulties in Ackerman's constitutional theory bear deep affinities to those in the work of his former Yale colleague, Alexander
M. Bickel7 (as well as those in the work of his current Yale colleague, Akhil Reed Amar). Bickel was haunted by the "countermajoritarian difficulty" that he thought judicial review posed in a
democracy because he held an impoverished conception of our
constitutional scheme as majoritarian representative democracy.
Similarly, Ackerman is hobbled by the quest for "the possibility of
popular sovereignty" because he holds a richer, yet still reductive,
conception of our constitutional scheme as popular sovereignty.

' In both Volume I and Volume II, Ackerman refers to the projected Volume III, to be
titled We the People: Interpretations.Ackerman, Foundationsat 99, 118, 162 (cited in note
1); Ackerman, Transformations(p 403).
' In formulating the idea of "The Constitution Goes to Yale," I have been inspired by
the title of a previous article about Harvard constitutional theorists. Henry P. Monaghan,
The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 Harv CR-CL L Rev 117 (1978).
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed.- ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum L Rev 457, 457 (1994) (stating, concerning responses to his theory
of constitutional amendment outside Article V, that "I suspected my audience might well
wonder if someone had been messing with the drinking water in New Haven").
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics(Yale 2d ed 1986).
" See Amar, 94 Colum L Rev 457 (cited in note 6); Akhil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited:Amending the Constitution OutsideArticle V, 55 U Chi L Rev 1043 (1988).
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As against the Yale school theorists, I contend that our Constitution is "incorrigible"' or "irreducible"" in the sense that it resists being reduced to either majoritarianism or popular sovereignty. To do justice to our Constitution, we need a dualist constitutional theory that conceives it as securing the basic liberties
that are preconditions for self-government in two senses: not only
deliberative democracy, whereby citizens apply their capacity for
a conception of justice to deliberating about the justice of basic
institutions and social policies, as well as about the common good,
but also deliberative autonomy, whereby citizens apply their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding how to live their own lives." Such a theory, unlike Ackerman's, would not transform our Constitution into the mold of
popular sovereignty.
I.

A.

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH
UNCONVENTIONAL HIGHER LAWMAKING

The Story Thus Far: Foundations

In Foundations, Ackerman mapped the terrain of American
constitutional theory as being divided into monists ("Anglophiles"), rights foundationalists ("Germanophiles"), and dualists
(red-blooded Americans)." Monism emphasizes popular sovereignty over and against fundamental rights, and thus tends to
equate popular sovereignty with parliamentary supremacy on a
British model. Rights foundationalism challenges the primacy of
popular sovereignty, stressing constraints imposed by deeper
commitments to fundamental rights on a German model. Ackerman presents dualism as an "accommodation" between monism
and rights foundationalism. Dualism distinguishes between the
constituent power of We the People, expressed in the higher law
of the Constitution, and the ordinary power of officers of government, expressed in the ordinary law of legislation. Dualism preserves, against encroachment by ordinary law, the fundamental
rights ordained and established by We the People in the higher
' See Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 NYU L Rev 893 (1990)
(arguing that our "incorrigible" justice-seeking Constitution resists being reduced to an
expression of popular sovereignty).
10 See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J Contemp Legal Issues 293
(1996) (arguing that our "irreducible" Constitution resists being reduced to either democracy or fundamental rights).
" See James E. Fleming, Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, 48 Stan L Rev 1, 2-3, 17-29
(1995); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex L Rev 211,
217-20, 280-97 (1993).
2 Ackerman, Foundationsat 6-16, 32-33, 35-36 (cited in note 1).
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law of the Constitution; to that extent, it is like rights foundationalism. But it preserves only those fundamental rights; beyond
them, it is like monism in deferring to ordinary law.
Ackerman argued that our dualist democracy has undergone
three great constitutional "moments" of higher lawmaking: the
Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal. 3 These moments inaugurated three regimes or republics within our Constitution: the
early republic of the Founding Federalists, the middle republic of
the Reconstruction Republicans, and the modern republic of the
New Deal Democrats. Ackerman sketched the processes of transformation through each moment and the substance of the higher
law of the Constitution during each republic. He argued that, in a
dualist democracy, judicial review is justified on the ground that
(and to the extent that) it preserves the higher law of the Constitution against encroachment by the ordinary law of legislation.'4
Finally, in justifying dualist democracy, he analyzed its foundations in a political theory, grounded in popular sovereignty, that
is a synthesis of the competing traditions of liberalism and republicanism."
B.

The Transformation of Dualist Democracy: Transformations

In Transformations,Ackerman elaborates upon the processes
of transformation through the Founding, Reconstruction, and
New Deal. He does not further develop the substance of the
higher law of each republic; that presumably will follow in Interpretations. He begins by refraining the Founding (pp 32-68). He
emphasizes that the Founding was a break with legality in the
sense that it did not play by the rules of the system of higher
lawmaking and amendment prescribed in the Articles of Confederation. The Continental Congress had authorized a constitutional convention to amend the Articles, not to draft a new Constitution, and the Articles had required that amendments be
adopted by every state, whereas under the proposed new Constitution, adoption by nine states out of thirteen was sufficient for
ratification. He conceives the Founding in terms of processes of
unconventional adaptation whereby the Federalists used existing
institutions in new ways to earn the authority to speak for the
People, distinguishing five stages of unconventional activity: signaling, proposing, triggering, ratifying, and consolidating. He argues that this model of transformation, not compliance with preId at 58-80.
Id at 60-61, 72.
"Id at 29-33.
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scribed rules for amendment, accounts for the legitimacy of the
constitutional change brought about through the Founding.
Ackerman then applies the precedent of the Founding to examine Reconstruction (pp 99-252). He argues that, in adopting
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Reconstruction also broke with legality by not following the rules of the
system of higher lawmaking and amendment specified in Article
V. For example, Congress overrode southern states' rejections of
the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, and conditioned each
state's representation in Congress upon: (1) its adoption of that
amendment, and (2) adoption of the amendment by the threefourths of the states required for it to become a part of the Constitution. Again, Ackerman uses the five-stage model of transformation to illuminate the processes of unconventional adaptation whereby Reconstruction Republicans earned the authority to
transform the Constitution in the name of the People.
Finally, in rethinking the New Deal, Ackerman argues that
it, by analogy to the Founding and Reconstruction, rises to the
level of a constitutional amendment and transformation (pp 279311). He acknowledges that the New Deal did not satisfy the formal rules for amending the Constitution specified in Article V,
but for him that fact is no more dispositive than is the fact that
the Founding Federalists and Reconstruction Republicans did not
play by the rules. On his view, the Founding and Reconstruction
brought about legitimate constitutional change because they satisfied the criteria for revision developed in his five-stage model of
transformation; for the same reason, so, too, did the New Deal.
Ackerman concedes that, however unconventional the Founding
and Reconstruction were when measured against the prescribed
rules for higher lawmaking, both of those transformations did
culminate in amendments to the text of the higher law. The New
Deal, however, was unconventional not only in its processes but
also in its outcome. It did not result in any amendments to the
text of the Constitution, and so to gather the content of the New
Deal transformation we must look to "transformative judicial
opinions" (pp 26, 359-77). These opinions provide a text-analogue
or the functional equivalent of a formal constitutional amendment. They established the constitutional permissibility of activist government in the regulatory and welfare state.
If the foils for dualism in Foundations were monism and
rights foundationalism, the foil for unconventional adaptation in
Transformations is Article V formalism or positivism: the view
that Article V prescribes the exclusive procedures for amending
the Constitution (pp 15-17, 28-31). As against Article V positiv-
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ists, Ackerman adumbrates a "humanistic positivism," which entails a pluralistic conception of the procedures for and sources of
higher lawmaking (p 92). On his view, the "rules of recognition"
for higher lawmaking, or criteria for legitimate constitutional revision, are not limited to the formal rules prescribed in Article V,
but include the criteria elaborated in his five-stage model of
transformation. And the sources of higher lawmaking include not
only the rules of Article V but also our principles, practices, and
precedents (most importantly, the great precedents of higher
lawmaking, the Founding and Reconstruction); in effect, he proposes a common law of higher lawmaking (pp 232, 383-84). And
so, as against Article V formalism, which presumes that Article V
channels all legitimate constitutional amendment through its
rules, Ackerman advances an understanding of unconventional
adaptation and transformation according to which legitimate
constitutional amendment occurs outside Article V.
Ackerman argues that Article V positivists cannot account
for the legitimacy of the constitutional change brought about
through either the Founding or Reconstruction, because neither
played by the formal rules laid down for amending the higher
law. Only his model of transformation can do so. He also argues
that Article V positivists cannot plausibly account for the legitimacy of the constitutional change during the New Deal. Having
gained a foothold for his model of transformation in justifying the
Founding and Reconstruction, he argues that it is also necessary
to account for the New Deal. He contends that the same criteria
for revision that establish the Founding and Reconstruction as
constitutional transformations also establish the New Deal as
one.
Article V positivists, Ackerman contends, do not merely deny
that the New Deal brought about a constitutional amendment
and transformation. Worse yet, they cloak its constitutional creativity in the "myth of rediscovery-the myth that the Supreme
Court in 1937 and afterward rediscovered the original understanding of the Constitution as contemplated by Founding Federalists, most notably James Madison and John Marshall (pp 8-10,
259, 279). This myth of rediscovery is troublesome not only because it obscures the foundations of the modern activist regulatory and welfare state inaugurated by the New Deal, but also because it denigrates the constitutional creativity of We the People,
thus undermining the possibility of popular sovereignty in
America. As against this view, Ackerman exhorts us to rediscover
or reclaim the Constitution and to preserve the possibility of
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popular sovereignty through unconventional adaptation and
transformation (pp 383-420).16

II. THE TRANSFORMATION, AND LEVELING, OF DUALISM
As described above, Ackerman argued in Foundations that
dualism offers a better account of our constitutional scheme than
monism or rights foundationalism. Nonetheless, in the closing
pages of that volume he called for moving "beyond dualism" to a
rights foundationalist scheme that would entrench inalienable
rights into our Constitution against subsequent amendment,,7
prompting some critics to wonder whether he was really a rights
foundationalist.'8 I shall take the opposite tack in criticizing
Transformations, suggesting instead that Ackerman's theory of
transformation itself transforms his theory of dualist democracy
into a form of monism.
A.

Reclaiming or Reconstructing the Classical, Interpretive
Justification of Judicial Review

Constitutional theorists since Bickel-and Ackerman is no
exception-have been troubled by the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" said to be posed by judicial review in a democracy. 9 The
classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, put forward
in The Federalist 78 and Marbury v Madison, purports to resolve
this difficulty." On this view, courts are obligated to interpret the
higher law of We the People embodied in the Constitution and to
preserve it against encroachment by the ordinary law of officers
of government embodied in legislation. Therefore, judicial review
implies constitutional, not judicial, supremacy, or the supremacy
of the People over their agents, the officers of government.
In recent years, narrow originalists like Robert Bork and
Justice Antonin Scalia have claimed a monopoly on the classical,
interpretive justification of judicial review.2 ' But Ackerman,
" Ackerman also calls for "reclaiming the Constitution" by reforming the higher lawmaking system through adopting a "Popular Sovereignty Initiative" by statute (pp 41016). I discuss this matter in note 33.
Ackerman, Foundationsat 319-22 (cited in note 1).
See, for example, Michael J. Klarman, ConstitutionalFact/ ConstitutionalFiction:A
Critiqueof Bruce Ackerman's Theory of ConstitutionalMoments, 44 Stan L Rev 759, 76364 n 37 (1992).
See Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch at 16-23 (cited in note 7); Bruce Ackerman,
Discoveringthe Constitution,93 Yale L J 1013, 1013-16 (1984).
' Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers 467, 469
(Mentor 1961); Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
21See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (Free Press 1990); Antonin Scalia, A
Matter ofInterpretation(Princeton 1997).
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through his theory of dualism, has sought to reclaim that justification and to reconstruct it. 2 He has done so by arguing that
higher lawmaking by We the People includes not only amendments to the Constitution adopted through the formal procedures
of Article V but also unconventional adaptation and transformation of the Constitution outside Article V. He reconstructs the
classical, interpretive justification in the sense that judicial review under his theory is likewise justified as preserving the
higher law of We the People (as he conceives it) against encroachment by the ordinary law of officers of government.
It is important to note that a constitutional theory can be
dualist in a general sense without being dualist in Ackerman's
specific sense. That is, a theory can insist upon maintaining the
distinction between the constituent power of We the People and
the ordinary power of officers of government without endorsing
his complex apparatus of higher lawmaking outside Article V. For
example, Ronald Dworkin's constitutional theory is dualist in this
general sense and indeed Dworkin, like Ackerman, seeks to reclaim and reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification of
judicial review.' Dworkin does so by putting forward a theory of
constitutional interpretation-both a conception of What the Constitution is and a conception of How it should be interpreted 2 4that is an alternative to that of the narrow originalists. As for
What, he argues that the Constitution embodies abstract moral
principles, rather than enacting relatively concrete rules. As for
How, he argues that interpreting and applying those principles
requires fresh judgments of political theory, rather than historical research to discover relatively specific original understanding
or original meaning. He now calls this interpretive strategy the
"moral reading" of the Constitution.'

See Ackerman, Foundationsat 60-61, 72 (cited in note 1); Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at
1046-51 (cited in note 19).
See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom'sLaw: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 72-83 (Harvard 1996); Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 11847 (Knopf 1993); Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 13149 (Harvard 1977); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous
Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L Rev 1249 (1997).
For another powerful attempt to reclaim the classical, interpretive justification of judicial
review from the narrow originalists, see Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial
Power 157-58 (Johns Hopkins 1993); Sotirios A. Barber, JudicialReview and The Federalist, 55 U Chi L Rev 836, 836-39 (1988).
' These questions of What and How, along with the question of Who is to interpret?,
are the basic interrogatives of constitutional interpretation. See Walter F. Murphy, James
E. Fleming, and Sotirios A. Barber, American ConstitutionalInterpretation(Foundation
2d ed 1995).
Dworkin, Freedom'sLaw at 1-38 (cited in note 23).
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The basic shortcoming of Ackerman's attempt to reclaim the
classical, interpretive justification of judicial review is that, unlike Dworkin, he attempts to do so without advancing a theory of
constitutional interpretation as an alternative to that of the narrow originalists. To be sure, Ackerman develops an alternative
conception of What the Constitution is-it includes not only
higher law adopted through the formal amending procedures of
Article V but also that ratified through unconventional adaptations and transformations outside Article V. But he does not advance an alternative understanding of How the Constitution
should be interpreted. What Volume II, Transformations, provides is not a theory of interpretation-we must hope for that in
the projected Volume HI, Interpretations-buta model of transformation whereby political figures and movements earn the
authority to speak in the name of We the People. In fact, Ackerman has not written anything in either Volume I or Volume H
about interpretation as a general theoretical matter. He promises
to develop concrete interpretations in Volume II.26 I return to

this matter below, in assessing Ackerman's claim that the "possibility of interpretation" depends upon our accepting his theory.
B.

The Leveling of Ackerman's Dualism

In Transformations, Ackerman does not make good on the
claim that his theory of dualist democracy reclaims or reconstructs the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review.
Instead, he develops that theory in a manner that may forfeit
that justification and along with it his claim to be a dualist. For
in Transformations,he practically levels his dualism to a form of
monism (or perhaps super-monism).
As stated above, dualists in a general sense maintain a basic
distinction between the higher law of We the People embodied in
the Constitution and the ordinary law of officers of government
embodied in legislation. On first sight, it might seem that almost
every constitutional scholar in America is a dualist in this sense.
Yet, to recall a term that Ackerman used in Discovering the Constitution,before he coined the term "monism," some constitutional
scholars in effect "level" the higher law to the level of ordinary
law.27 There are several ways that they do this. One approach is

' Ackerman states that '[w]hile interpretivists [who take interpretation seriously]
have launched a jurisprudential counteroffensive [against 'realist banalities'] over the last
decade," citing Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard 1986), he has "been on a different
mission," that of "providing concrete interpretations of the constitutional past" (p 419).
Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at 1035-38 (cited in note 19).
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to propose that judicial review should be extremely deferential to
legislatures and executives, indeed so deferential that it levels
the Constitution in the sense that for all practical purposes it
does not limit legislation. James Bradley Thayer and Justice
Felix Frankfurter are such levelers.' Another way to level the
higher law is to argue that it is exclusively or overwhelmingly
concerned with securing procedural rights that are preconditions
for the legitimacy of ordinary law as opposed to securing substantive rights that limit what government may do through ordinary
law. Ackerman characterizes John Hart Ely as such a leveler.'
A third way to level the higher law of the Constitution is to
suggest that higher lawmaking is not as fundamentally different
from ordinary lawmaking as it initially appeared to be (when we
characterized dualism as distinguishing two tracks of lawmaking). Ackerman proves to be a leveler in this sense. He does not
make the general dualist argument that there are two distinct
tracks of lawmaking-higher lawmaking through the procedures
prescribed in Article V and ordinary lawmaking through the procedures prescribed in Article I. Instead, he makes the argument
that we have two routes of higher lawmaking-one through following the procedures of Article V and another through engaging
in political activity that proceeds through the five stages of his
model of transformation. The latter route looks like an intermediate track of lawmaking, perhaps super-ordinary lawmaking
through sustained, deep, and broad success in the electoral and
legislative processes; hence my suggestion that Ackerman "levels"
his dualism to a form of super-monism."
Ackerman, Foundationsat 7, 11 (cited in note 1) (characterizing Thayer and Frankfurter as monists"). See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw, 7 Harv L Rev 129 (1893); Minersville School Districtv Gobitis, 310 US 586 (1940) (Frankfurter, giving the opinion of the Court); West Virginia State
BoardofEducation v Barnette,319 US 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter dissenting) (objecting
to the Court's overturningMinersville).
Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at 1047-49 (cited in note 19), criticizing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust(Harvard 1980).
In characterizing Ackerman as a leveler, I do not mean to suggest that his theory of
constitutional change invariably makes it easier to amend the higher law of the Constitution than does Article V. In fact, his theory is at once less and more demanding than Article V. For example, the New Deal amended the Constitution according to Ackerman's theory despite the fact that it did not satisfy the requirements of Article V. Yet many of the
formal amendments to the Constitution that have satisfied Article V's requirements, such
as the Twentieth Amendment (changing the date of the end of the President's and Vice
Presidents terms from March 4 to January 20), and the Twenty-Third Amendment (providing for electors of the President and Vice President from the District of Columbia),
would not be able to satisfy Ackerman's criteria for revision. This should come as no surprise because Ackerman is offering criteria for legitimate constitutional transformation,
whereas Article V specifies rules for mere amendment: the former is about fundamental
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The driving force behind Ackerman's leveling of dualism is
his notion of popular sovereignty, which bridles at Article V's pretensions to rein it in. This point is nowhere more clear than in
Ackerman's claim that, to realize the possibility of popular sovereignty, we must move beyond theories that stringently maintain
the distinction between the two tracks of lawmaking to embrace a
theory that acknowledges the unruly, unconventional ways in
which the forces of popular sovereignty have transformed our
higher law along with our higher lawmaking system. I take up
this claim below.
Furthermore, Ackerman's theory of transformations practically levels popular sovereignty from constituent power to ordinary power (albeit ordinary power exercised in extraordinary circumstances or moments). The notion of popular sovereignty is notoriously ambiguous, mysterious, and vague,3 although it is not
always acknowledged to be so in constitutional theory. Monists
and dualists have very different conceptions of the notion of
popular sovereignty. As conceived by monists, it refers basically
to parliamentary supremacy on a British model, and it amounts
to the ordinary power of officers of government engaged in passing the ordinary law of legislation in a majoritarian representative democracy. But popular sovereignty as conceived by dualists
refers in the first instance to the constituent power engaged in
deliberating
about and adopting the higher law of the Constitu32
-tion.
When Ackerman initially sketches the foundations of dualist
democracy, he seems to contemplate popular sovereignty in the
latter sense. But by the time he elaborates upon the transformation to the New Deal, at the behest of popular sovereignty outside
Article V, he seems practically to contemplate popular soverchange, whereas the latter may be about revision of relatively insignificant administrative
details.
"I See Wayne D. Moore, ConstitutionalRights and Powers of the People 90-99 (Princeton 1996) (analyzing some of the ambiguities in the ideas of popular sovereignty and of
"the people"); Frank I. Michelman, Always Under Law?, 12 Const Comm 227, 227 (1995)
(characterizing the notion of popular sovereignty as having "an evocative or idealizing" or
quasi-mythical status"); Sager, 65 NYU L Rev at 902-09 (cited in note 9) (criticizing constitutional theories grounded in popular sovereignty). Ackerman claims to provide a "humanistic positivism" with "rules of recognition" for higher lawmaking by We the People,
the popular sovereign, that is analogous to the sophisticated positivism developed by
H.LA_ Hart in his classic work, The Concept of Law 70-76 (Oxford 1961). But Hart himself
noted some of the difficulties and implausibilities of applying the notion of a "sovereign,"
which in theory must be free from all legal limitations, to a legal system such as that of
the United States, in which the Constitution places legal limitations on legislative powers.
Id at 71-78.
' See John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism 231 (Columbia 1993).
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eignty in the former sense. Admittedly, the popular sovereignty
that he envisions is more sustained, deeper, and broader than
that of the monist notion of popular sovereignty as parliamentary
supremacy or majoritarian representative democracy. And it is
popular sovereignty that expresses itself in extraordinary moments. But it is popular sovereignty that can exert itself unconventionally through elections rather than ratifying bodies, and
through statutes and even judicial opinions rather than formal
amendments. Therein lies the proof that Ackerman has leveled
dualism. Indeed, for Ackerman, the People can even purport formally to amend the Constitution through a statute (pp 4 14-1 6 ).'
As compared with Ackerman, dualists who more rigorously maintain the distinction between higher lawmaking and ordinary
lawmaking, along with that between constituent power and ordinary power, may have a superior claim to be dualists and may be
in a better position to reclaim and reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review.
C. From Positivism Without Law to Judicial Lawmaking
Through Transformative Judicial Opinions
That is not all. Ackerman also may forfeit his claim to be invoking the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review.
Again, dualists resolve the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" by
arguing that judicial review interpreting and preserving the
higher law of the Constitution against encroachment by the ordinary law of legislation entails constitutional, not judicial, supremacy. Some critics of Foundations argued that Ackerman's
dualism, and in particular his theory that the New Deal was a
constitutional amendment, was an ironic instance of "legal positivism without positive law.' 4 That is, Ackerman claimed to be
Ackerman proposes reform of the Constitution's higher lawmaking system through
adopting a "Popular Sovereignty Initiative" by statute (pp 410-16). The Popular Sovereignty Initiative would authorize the President, upon reelection to a second term, to propose amendments to the Constitution in the name of the People. When approved by Congress, such proposals would be placed on the ballot at the next two Presidential elections
rather than sent to the states for ratification. If a proposal gained popular approval
through such a national referendum, it would be added to the Constitution. Ackerman also
argues that the provision for the Popular Sovereignty Initiative itself should be adopted by
these same procedures rather than through the procedures of Article V requiring ratification by the states.
The Popular Sovereignty Initiative is in some senses more than an ordinary statute;
Ackerman refers to it as a "special statute" (p 415). But it also illustrates a leveling of dualism in the sense that it provides for amendment of the Constitution in a manner that is
more popular, and less removed from election returns and political mandates, than are the
procedures of Article V.
"Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 215-28 (Harvard 1995) (criticizing Ackerman's
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developing a positivist theory that could establish that the New
Deal was a constitutional amendment, but his theory did not provide any higher law-a constitutional text or text-analogue-that
constituted the amendment and that therefore could be interpreted and preserved against encroachment by ordinary law.
In Transformations, Ackerman puts forward the idea of
"transformative judicial opinions" to fill in the content of the New
Deal amendment (pp 26, 359-77). These opinions, written mostly
between 1937 and 1942 by FDR's new appointees to the Supreme
Court-the "transformative judicial appointees"-gave content to
the New Deal transformation's general commitment to activist
government in the regulatory and welfare state (or, more properly, established the constitutional permissibility of such government). They rendered the considered political judgments of
We the People, or popular sovereignty, expressed through the
electoral and political processes, into the vernacular of constitutional law. And in Ackerman's theory, these transformative judicial opinions supplied the deficiency of positivism without law, for
they provided the law-the text-analogue-needed to specify the
New Deal amendment to the Constitution. These opinions, as
Ackerman puts it, are "the functional equivalent of formal constitutional amendments" (pp 26, 361).
Not so fast. This move may be available to some constitutional scholars, such as realists who believe that courts to some
extent operate as a continually sitting constitutional convention.
But it would seem not to be available to Ackerman, so long as he
claims to be reclaiming or reconstructing the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review. For this move all but concedes
that when judges engage in judicial review during constitutional
moments, they are literally making, rather than interpreting, the
higher law ordained and established by the Constitution. Constitutional scholars who are haunted by the "counter-majoritarian
difficulty" dread the nightmare of judges functioning as the
equivalent of a continually sitting constitutional convention.3 5
The classical, interpretive justification's response to the charge of
judicial supremacy with the claim of constitutional supremacythat it is not the judges, but the Constitution in the name of We
the People, who did it-can allay that dread only if in principle
the content of the Constitution is something other than judicial
theory in Foundationsin a chapter entitled "Legal Positivism without Positive Law").
' For the idea of the "nightmare" of judges never finding, but always only making,
law, see H.LA Hart, American Jurisprudencethrough English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, in H.LA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudenceand Philosophy 123, 126 (Oxford 1983).
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opinions. By advancing the notion that transformative judicial
opinions provide the content of the higher law of the Constitution,
Ackerman aggravates rather than allays that dread.
Ackerman no doubt would respond that the justices issuing
transformative judicial opinions did so in the name of the higher
law of the Constitution, as established through the New Deal
amendment, which itself was ratified by We the People through
the five-stage model of transformation. Thus, the justices spoke
in those opinions in the name of the People after all, and they can
put on the mantle of constitutional supremacy as distinguished
from judicial supremacy. But this response loses plausibility
when justices are interpreting election returns and political mandates, and writing a constitutional text-analogue to codify them,
rather than interpreting a text given to them (even if the text has
an unconventional pedigree, as on Ackerman's account the Fourteenth Amendment does (pp 99-119)). For justices have no special
competence in interpreting election returns and political mandates, and in any event such political phenomena are unavoidably majoritarian.
D. The Thinness of Ackerman's Dualism
Our constitutional scheme is dualist not only in the general
sense just analyzed but also in the substantive sense that it is a
synthesis of the conflicting traditions of civic republicanism and
liberalism. This conflict is encapsulated in Benjamin Constant's
famous contrast between the tradition associated with JeanJacques Rousseau, which gives primacy to the liberties of the ancients, such as the equal political liberties and the values of public life, and the tradition associated with John Locke, which gives
greater weight to the liberties of the moderns, such as liberty of
conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property, and
the rule of law." Many constitutional theorists, including Ackerman, have offered their theories as syntheses of these two traditions. I have suggested elsewhere that certain liberals have coopted the revival of the republican tradition by constructing syntheses that have yielded thinner accounts of republicanism than
one might have expected and than republicans might have hoped

Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism at 4-5, 299 (cited in note 32), referring to Benjamin Constant, Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns (1819), in Benjamin Constant, PoliticalWritings 307 (Cambridge 1988) (Fontana trans). Locke's most significant
work in this respect is John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge 2d ed 1967)
(Peter Laslett, ed), and Rousseau's is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (St
Martin's 1978) (Roger D. Masters, ed, and Judith R. Masters, trans).
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for." Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein are the most obvious
cases in point."8 But Ackerman too is a liberal who has gotten on
this bandwagon, calling his theory a "liberal republicanism,"39
and his synthesis is thinner still.
For one thing, Ackerman's version of a liberal republicanism
is more a "cycle" or rotation between liberalism and republicanism than a synthesis of them. During periods of ordinary politics,
we have liberalism (as Ackerman puts it, we are private citizens),
and during moments of constitutional politics and periods of
transformation, we turn to republicanism (as he puts it, we are
private citizens),0 rather than having a synthesis of liberalism
and republicanism both in ordinary politics and in constitutional
politics. For another, the liberalism in play in Ackerman's dualism is quite thin. It is basically liberalism as conceived by interest-group pluralists like Robert Dah14 ' rather than liberalism as
conceived by liberal republicans or deliberative democrats like
Michelman and Sunstein. Unlike the latter theorists, Ackerman
does not advance a conception of deliberative democracy that requires government to provide public-regarding reasons concerning the common good for its actions, even in ordinary politics, and
that forbids government from acting solely on the basis of the
self-interested preferences of well-organized private groups or individuals. What is more, the republicanism in play in his theory
is also quite thin. He seems to conceive republican selfgovernment entirely in terms of deliberation about the content of
the higher law rather than in terms of deliberation about the
common good in adopting ordinary law.4"
A richer and better synthesis of these competing traditionsor substantive dualism-would conceive both ordinary politics
and the content of the higher law of the Constitution as syntheses
James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76

Tex L Rev 509, 548-49 (1997).
"For Michelman's synthesis of these two traditions, see, for example, Frank I.
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L J 1493, 1524-32 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4, 3647 (1986). For Sunstein's synthesis, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution 133-41 (Harvard 1993); Cass . Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
Yale L J 1539, 1566-71 (1988).
Ackerman, Foundationsat 29-33 (cited in note 1).
Id at 31-32 (describing a "recurring cycle of normal, then constitutional, then normal
politics" or "cyclical pattern" between liberal normal politics and republican constitutional
politics).
1 See id at 230-65. Dahl has provided one of the classic accounts of American democracy in terms of interest-group pluralism. See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic
Theory (Chicago 1956). I concede that there are differences between Ackerman's vision of
normal politics and Dahl's conception of interest-group pluralism.
42Ackerman, Foundationsat 266-94 (cited in note 1).
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of liberalism and republicanism. Elsewhere, I have argued for a
constitutional theory within which both ordinary politics and constitutional politics are such syntheses. It combines a "republican"
theme of securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for
deliberative democracy (or the liberties of the ancients), with a
"liberal" theme of securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy (or the liberties of the moderns).'
Such a theory provides the basis for a richer form of dualism than
Ackerman's.
III.

THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

Is Article V of the Constitution a fixed point-or foundational
text--that any constitutional theory, including those grounded in
popular sovereignty, must be able acceptably to fit and justify? Or
is Article V a pox upon the Constitution that any theory of popular sovereignty worthy of invoking the name We the People
should seek to limit and contain, if possible, by supplementing or
even overriding it?" Is it possible to articulate a constitutional
theory that gives due regard to popular sovereignty but that also
takes Article V seriously as prescribing the exclusive procedures
for amending the Constitution?
Ackerman contends that "the possibility of popular sovereignty" under our Constitution depends upon our accepting his
theory of unconventional adaptation and transformation outside
Article V (p 119). 45 What does he mean by this claim? He seems to

be making both a justificatory claim and a hortatory claim. The
justificatory claim is that our Constitution-notwithstanding the
text of Article V in the Constitution itself-presupposes a theory
of popular sovereignty in light of which Article V is incomplete, a
compromise, or even a mistake (if it purports to prescribe the exclusive procedures for making higher law). Therefore, in order for
the Constitution to be able to realize its commitment to popular
sovereignty, and indeed for it to be legitimate, We the People
must be free to amend and transform it outside the formal procedures of Article V, including through the model of transformation
that Ackerman develops. Otherwise, we are not a properly selfgoverning People.
' Fleming, 48 Stan L Rev at 25 (cited in note 11); Fleming, 72 Tex L Rev at 249-50,
252-53 (cited in note 11).
" For the suggestion, in a Symposium on "Constitutional Stupidities," that Article V is
the stupidest provision in the Constitution, see Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee is... Article V, 12 Const Comm 171 (1995).
" The particular formulation, "the possibility of popular sovereignty," occurs on page
119, but the claim or theme is pervasive throughout the entire volume.
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The hortatory claim is that We the People are more likely to
live up to the rights and responsibilities of self-government if we
believe that the People, as recently as the New Deal, rose to the
occasion of transforming the higher law of the Constitution. After
all, if We the People have done so only once (or perhaps twice) in
American history, and not since the Founding (or possibly Reconstruction) at that, what is the hope of the People accomplishing
anything great by way of higher lawmaking in our time? Other
theories, including those of Article V exclusivity, denigrate the
constitutional creativity of We the People, and thus may demoralize or debilitate the People, undermining the possibility of
popular sovereignty.
To these claims, I offer three responses. First, through advancing the idea that "the possibility of popular sovereignty" requires us to supplement or even override Article V, Ackerman
proves in Transformations to be a popular sovereignty-perfecting
theorist. That is, he is arguing that the Constitution presupposes
a theory of popular sovereignty in light of which Article V-evidently a fixed point or foundational text-can be seen to be incomplete, a compromise, or even a mistake. And he is arguing for
interpreting the Constitution so as to perfect it from the standpoint of his theory of popular sovereignty, even to the point of
supplementing or overriding provisions of its text. In terms of
Dworkin's well-known formulations, Ackerman is calling for interpreting the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be and
putting forward a "moral reading" of the Constitution.4 6
To suggest that Ackerman's theory, notwithstanding his
strenuous and strained efforts in Foundationsto differentiate it
from theories like Dworkin's4 reflects a moral reading of the
Constitution is certainly not to say that it is wrong or incoherent.
Indeed, elsewhere I have advanced what I call a "Constitutionperfecting theory,' which reflects a moral reading. Rather, it is
See Dworkin, Freedom's Law at 1-38 (cited in note 23) (proposing an interpretive
strategy called the "moral reading" of the Constitution). See also Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 146-66 (Harvard 1985) (arguing for interpreting a legal text such as the
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be); Dworkin, Law's Empire at 176-275 (cited
in note 26) (same).
" Ackerman, Foundations at 10-16, 32-33 (cited in note 1) (differentiating his own
theory of dualist democracy from a theory of "rights foundationalism" that he attributes to
Dworkin in such works as Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (cited in note 23), and
Dworkin, Law's Empire (cited in note 26)). Elsewhere, I have analyzed Ackerman's attempt to differentiate his theory from theories like Dworkin's. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L Rev 1335, 1336-38, 1344-55 (1997);
Fleming, 11 Const Comm at 366-68 (cited in note 3).
"Fleming, 65 Fordham L Rev at 1338, 1344-55 (cited in note 47) (endorsing and defending the idea of the moral reading); Fleming, 48 Stan L Rev at 15-16 (cited in note 11)
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to suggest that Ackerman's own development of his theory shows
that we should assess it on different grounds than he initially offered it. Applying Dworkin's distinction between two dimensions
of best interpretation, fit and justification,4 9 he had asserted that
"fit is everything' and thus had implied that there was no need
to resort to the dimension of justification in deciding which of the
available competing theories provides the best account of our constitutional scheme. He had submitted that only his theory of dualist democracy and popular sovereignty-as against theories like
Dworkin's--could fit the text of the Constitution and our constitutional experience. 5 Admittedly, Ackerman would respond that
his theory provides the best interpretation of our constitutional
scheme-as a matter of justification as well as fit-but to sustain
that claim he would need to offer a fuller justification for dualist
democracy and popular sovereignty than he has provided thus
far.
Second, Ackerman does not show the impossibility of--or
give sufficient attention to the possibility of-a constitutional
theory that both gives due regard to the claims of popular sovereignty and takes Article V seriously as a fixed point of the Constitution that any constitutional theory must be able acceptably to
fit and justify. Here, I sketch a dualist constitutional theory that
does so. The claims of popular sovereignty certainly have a place,
and carry great weight, in constitutional theory, but not the place
or the weight that Ackerman gives them. Our Constitution's
commitment to popular sovereignty is not incompatible with Article V exclusivity. Our constitutional scheme is dualist in a general sense-it prescribes distinct tracks for higher lawmaking
and for ordinary lawmaking-and our commitment to popular
sovereignty is expressed through and limited by Article V's procedures for higher lawmaking. On this view, We the People ordained and established the Constitution, and from time to time
have amended it, and thus the Constitution manifests popular
sovereignty. But the Constitution also constitutes a scheme of
government and a charter of principles that seek to establish justice and to express the fundamental commitments and highest
(arguing for a "Constitution-perfecting theory"); Fleming, 72 Tex L Rev at 214 & n 15
(cited in note 11) (same).
" For examples of Dworkin's formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation-fit and justification-see Dworkin, Law's Empire at 239 (cited in note 26); Dworkin,
A Matter ofPrinciple at 143-45 (cited in note 46); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 107
(cited in note 23).
"Bruce Ackerman, Remarks at the New York University School of Law Colloquium
on Constitutional Theory (Nov 16, 1993) (colloquy between Ackerman and Dworkin).
" Ackerman, Foundationsat 10-16, 32-33 (cited in note 1).
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aspirations of a people.5 2 Once a workable Constitution of principle is in place, living under it, and interpreting it with integrity
so as to make it the best it can be, carry their own imperatives.
We should interpret the Constitution, both inside and outside the
courts, so as to secure the basic liberties that are the preconditions for the legitimacy and trustworthiness of political decisions
in our constitutional democracy. In justifying interpretations of
it, we need not always make recourse to the fount of popular sovereignty. For our Constitution expresses commitments and aspirations besides popular sovereignty, and it may be legitimate and
trustworthy for reasons other than conformity to popular sovereignty.
Ackerman is in the grip of an assumption or premise that the
fundamental value or point of our Constitution and our democracy is a commitment to popular sovereignty." This premise undergirds a popular sovereignty conception of democracy that is
not true to our scheme of government and that indeed obscures
the true character and importance of our system. Instead, our
Constitution reflects and presupposes a constitutional conception
of democracy (or constitutional democracy) that conceives the
fundamental point or value of our democracy to be concern for securing for everyone the status of free and equal citizenship.'
Within such a dualist constitutional democracy, securing the preconditions for self-government requires not merely preserving the
possibility of popular sovereignty. It requires securing the basic
liberties that are preconditions for self-government in two senses:
not only deliberative democracy but also deliberative autonomy.5 5

For conceptions of the Constitution along these lines, in terms of a "justice-seeking"
account, as against conceptions of it in terms of popular sovereignty and backward-looking
"instruction-taking," see, for example, Lawrence G. Sager, The Betrayal of Judgment, 65
Fordham L Rev 1545 (1997); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on
the Thinness of ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw U L Rev 410 (1993); Sager, 65 NYU L Rev 893
(cited in note 9); Lawrence G. Sager, Democracy and the Justice-Seeking Constitution,paper presented at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional
Theory (Apr 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with U Chi L Rev); Sotirios A.
Barber, Justice-Seeking Constitutionalism and Its Critics, paper presented at the New
York University School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory (Apr 20, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with U Chi L Rev).
For a similar critique of the "majoritarian premise" undergirding majoritarian conceptions of democracy, and an argument for a constitutional conception of democracy, see
Dworkin, Freedom'sLaw at 15-18 (cited in note 23).
See Fleming, 48 Stan L Rev at 3, 20 (cited in note 11); Fleming, 72 Tex L Rev at 253,
296-97 (cited in note 11). I have noted that this conception of constitutional democracy is
similar to what Dworkin calls a "constitutional conception of democracy." See Fleming, 65
Fordham L Rev at 1342 (cited in note 47), discussing Dworkin, Freedom'sLaw at 17 (cited
in note 23).
"See Fleming, 48 Stan L Rev at 2-3, 17-29 (cited in note 11); Fleming, 72 Tex L Rev
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From the standpoint of a dualist theory of constitutional democracy, it would be inapt to criticize Article V (or the Constitution generally) for its failure to conform to a deeper, richer, or
more thoroughgoing commitment to popular sovereignty. Only a
leveler who was in the grip of a different theory of popular sovereignty than that which the Constitution reflects and presupposes
would make such a criticism. A dualist who understood the character of the higher law of our Constitution and the commitments
of our constitutional democracy would not reduce our constitutional scheme into a manifestation of popular sovereignty, or
transform it in the image of popular sovereignty.
In support of Article V exclusivity in such a dualist scheme, I
would say two things. For one thing, I would give two cheers for
Article V in a defensive sense, for it has protected the Constitution and its citizens against the recent rash of "amendmentitis." 6
Numerous illiberal and ill-conceived 'amendments that would
erode basic liberties or limit important powers have been introduced in Congress in recent years: the Flag Burning Amendment,
the Balanced Budget Amendment, the Parental Rights Amendment, the Religious Freedom Amendment, and the Human Life
Amendment, to name a few. Despite the claims of representatives
and senators in Congress to have a mandate from the People, all
of the measures that have come up for a vote have failed to secure
the two-thirds vote of both houses required by Article V to propose an amendment for ratification by the states. Article V's requirements have protected the Constitution and its citizens from
such measures.57
For another, there is much to be said for Article V in an affirmative sense. As Lawrence Sager has cogently argued, the obduracy of Article V to ready and easy amendment of the Constitution has encouraged and fostered broad interpretation of the Constitution's rights-protecting and power-conferring provisions." It
at 217-20, 280-97 (cited in note 11).
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, Am Prospect 20 (Fall
1995) (criticizing the recent rash of proposals to amend the Constitution).
" I acknowledge that Article V's requirements also have made it difficult to secure
adoption of amendments that would secure basic liberties, such as the Equal Rights
Amendment. But the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted to secure equal citizenship for women.
5 Sager, Democracy and the Justice-Seeking Constitution (cited in note 52); Lawrence
G. Sager, The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution,paper presented at the New York
University School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory (Feb 9, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with U Chi L Rev). I should make clear that although I would defend
Article V affirmatively for its super-majority requirements for amending the Constitution,
I would argue that a provision for ratification of a proposed amendment by a supermajority of the people of the United States is more defensible than Article V's provisions
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has underscored the character of the Constitution as a charter of
majestic generalities and abstract principles as opposed to a code
of relatively specific original understandings. Thus, Article V has
underwritten approaches to constitutional interpretation like
those of Dworkin's moral reading, Sager's justice-seeking constitutionalism, and my own Constitution-perfecting theory. And
such approaches to interpretation are appropriate in a dualist
scheme of constitutional democracy of the sort sketched above.
Unfortunately, Ackerman does not seriously engage such arguments.59 Worse yet, his theory of amendment and transformation
seems to presuppose a remarkably (and uncharacteristicall ° )
narrow view of interpretation: that interpretation does not countenance change, and therefore that change may occur only
through amendment. I return to this issue below.
Third, Ackerman's theory of popular sovereignty and transformation meets with difficulty in fitting and justifying our dualist constitutional scheme. Our constitutional order cannot be reduced to a scheme of popular sovereignty, nor can our basic liberties (and leading cases interpreting them since 1937) be reduced
to the structure of the modern republic brought about by the
transformation to New Deal Democracy.
Ackerman's popular sovereignty-perfecting approach to interpreting the Constitution bears a family resemblance to representation-reinforcing or process-perfecting theories such as those
of Ely and Sunstein.6' Elsewhere, I have criticized the architecture of the latter theories, which attempt to frame or recast all of
our basic liberties, both substantive and procedural, as precondi-

regarding ratification by three-fourths of the states (an argument with which Ackerman
would presumably agree, see pp 410-16).
Ackerman stated in colloquy with Sager at a recent symposium that Sager's article,
65 NYU L Rev 893 (cited in note 9), posed a "great question": "whether [Ackerman's]
model is compatible with the abstract character of the constitutional enterprise." He continued: "Larry [Sager], I read your article several times, I should assure you. But I have to
think more about it." Fidelity as Synthesis: Colloquy, 65 Fordham L Rev 1581, 1582 (1997)
(colloquy between Ackerman and Sager). Yet in Transformations,Ackerman does not address Sager's arguments.
' I say that Ackerman's theory of amendment seems to presuppose an "uncharacteristically" narrow view of interpretation in light of the fact that Ackerman is often characterized as a "broad originalist," see note 74, and that he elsewhere has written about interpretation in terms of the Constitution's highly abstract provisions regarding rights and
powers, or its "liberating abstraction." Bruce Ackerman, LiberatingAbstraction, 59 U Chi
L Rev 317 (1992).
" See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 87-104 (cited in note 29) (advancing a "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review); Sunstein, The PartialConstitution at 142-44
(cited in note 38) (advancing a theory of judicial review whereby courts principally should
secure the procedural preconditions for deliberative democracy).
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tions for representative or deliberative democracy.6 2 I have ar-

gued instead for a Constitution-perfecting theory with two fundamental themes, which would reinforce not only the procedural
liberties (those associated with deliberative democracy), but also
the substantive liberties (those related to deliberative autonomy)
embodied in our Constitution.
My critique of the architecture of theories like Ely's and Sunstein's applies with some force to the architecture of Ackerman's
theory, which reduces our Constitution to a manifestation of

popular sovereignty, and recasts its provisions so as to secure the
preconditions for popular sovereignty. For example, whereas Ely
and Sunstein reject the substantive liberties like privacy or
autonomy at issue in cases like Griswold v Connecticut' and Roe
v Wade,' 4 or recast them in procedural terms, Ackerman attempts
to justify such liberties and cases in terms of We the People's
transformation of the Constitution through the New Deal.' In
particular, I would emphasize two reasons for the superiority of a
Constitution-perfecting theory with the foregoing two themes.
The first reason is architectonic: presenting our basic liberties in
terms of deliberative democracy' and deliberative autonomy illustrates that these two fundamental themes are co-original and of
equal weight, and that neither is foundational.' For both themes
derive from a common substrate: a conception of citizens as free
and equal persons (with two moral powers corresponding to the
two themes) and a conception of society as a fair system of social
cooperation. Both themes are constitutive of and articulate preconditions for the legitimacy and trustworthiness of political decisions in our constitutional democracy. Our Constitution resists
being reduced to an expression of popular sovereignty, just as it
resists being recast into the mold of representative or deliberative
democracy.
The second reason is elegance: the importance of being elegant (though not too reductive) in constructing a constitutional
theory. Ackerman's theory, ironically, is not only reductive in the
way just discussed but also inelegant. By his own self-deprecating
characterization, it may appear to be an "unworkable Rube Goldberg contraption." 7 To be sure, our constitutional scheme is coin-

See Fleming, 48 Stan L Rev at 27-29 (cited in note 11); Fleming, 72 Tex L Rev at
233-38, 256-60 (cited in note 11).
U 381 US 479 (1965).
410 US 113 (1973).
See Ackerman, Foundationsat 150-59 (cited in note 1).
See Fleming, 48 Stan L Rev at 28 (cited in note 11).
Ackerman, Foundationsat 61 (cited in note 1).
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plex, and may require complex theories to account for it. But a
Constitution-perfecting theory, with the two fundamental themes
of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, can more
elegantly, straightforwardly, and plausibly account for our dualist constitutional scheme than can Ackerman's theory. Furthermore, the fact that the apparatus of Ackerman's theory is quite
unwieldy is troublesome given his hortatory claims for it. It may
be more effective to advance a hortatory constitutionalism that
can appeal directly to our aspirational principles of liberty,
equality, and justice in addition to democracy, rather than to deploy a framework that may garble the exhortations because it always has to reconceive them in terms of the touchstone of popular
sovereignty. Because Dworkin's moral reading of the Constitution, Sager's justice-seeking constitutionalism, and my own Constitution-perfecting theory can appeal directly to such aspirational principles, they may be more effective in supporting a comprehensible hortatory constitutionalism than is Ackerman's theory.
Finally, our basic liberties (and leading cases interpreting
them since 1937) cannot be reduced to a manifestation of popular
sovereignty or justified in terms of the structure of the modern
New Deal republic. We might concede to Ackerman that the New
Deal was the last fundamental transformation of the Constitution
(in a general sense, not in Ackerman's specific sense of amending
the Constitution) and also grant that he is right that the purported Reagan Revolution failed to bring about a transformation
(pp 389-403), yet still be unable to justify much of contemporary
constitutional law in terms of the transformation to New Deal
Democracy and the fundamental commitments of the modern
New Deal republic. (I return to this point in assessing Ackerman's claim about "the possibility of interpretation.") This is not
to say that we do not need an account of the political transformation wrought by the New Deal to get us to where we are today.
Rather, it is to say that we need more than the New Deal transformation to do so. We need a theoretical structure that will go
beyond that transformation and beyond popular sovereignty to
provide a substantive account of our scheme of basic liberties. In
short, we need a dualist constitutional theory of the sort I have
sketched.
IV.

THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERPRETATION

Ackerman also suggests that to preserve or realize "the possibility of interpretation" of our Constitution-as opposed to a realist vision of judicial lawmaking-we must accept his theory of
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amendment and transformation outside Article V. He stated this
claim in Foundations," alludes to it in Transformations (p 419),
69 But the
and promises to elaborate upon it in Interpretations.
claim should be assessed here, because it exposes a fundamental
shortcoming in Ackerman's theory: He does not put forward a
theory of interpretation!
I daresay that Ackerman's failure to develop a theory of interpretation may help to explain why he develops a theory of
amendment outside Article V. That is, if Ackerman had a broad
conception of interpretation, he would not need such a theory of
amendment. Along similar lines, some critics have suggested that
Ackerman's project reflects a remarkably narrow view of interpretation: 0 that interpretation does not countenance change;
therefore, change may occur only through amendment; hence, for
the Constitution to be interpretable after the change brought
about during the New Deal, it must have been amended through
the New Deal.
Furthermore, despite Ackerman's claim about "the possibility
of interpretation," it is impossible, plausibly and elegantly, to justify our basic liberties and many of the leading constitutional law
decisions since 1937 in terms of popular sovereignty and the New
Deal transformation. In fact, the cases that Ackerman analyzes
in Foundationsin connection with "the possibility of interpretation"7 --Brown v Board of Education and Griswold v Connecticut-are difficult to justify in these terms. It is more straightforward to justify those decisions in terms of equal citizenship and
privacy than in terms of the transformation to the activist regulatory and welfare state. The point is not simply that those casesand many others that follow, including PlannedParenthoodv Casey' 2 -seem far afield from the transformation to the New Deal,
but also that the accounts Ackerman offers of them are far less
elegant and apt than other available accounts.
' Id at 131-62. Ackerman had previewed this idea in Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at 107072 (cited in note 19).
' Ackerman, Foundations at 162 (cited in note 1) (referring to projected Volume III,
Interpretations).
,"Sunstein also has charged that Ackerman's theory of amendment presupposes an
"unduly rigid view of interpretation." Cass R. Sunstein, New Deals, New Republic 32, 35
(Jan 20, 1992).
Ackerman, Foundations at 131-62 (cited in note 1), analyzing Brown v Board of
Education, 347 US 483 (1954), and Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
' 505 US 833 (1992). Ackerman briefly analyzes Casey in Transformations (pp 397402). He does not give a full account of that case, or the right to abortion, in relation to the
New Deal transformation. Rather, he focuses on "Casey's characterization of the situation
in 1937" (p 399).
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Ackerman presumably will say more about interpretation, if
not put forward a theory of interpretation, in the projected Volume II, Interpretations.Here I want to suggest that Ackerman's
presuppositions about interpretation in Transformations may
pose or aggravate difficulties for his development of a theory of
interpretation and advancement of concrete interpretations in Interpretations.For Volume Irs model of transformations-and the
underlying conception of three republics constituted by the
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal--emphasizes the
discontinuity between each republic, and presumably the discontinuity between the substance of the higher law of the Constitution for each republic. Yet in Volume IH, Ackerman will quest for
fidelity as "intergenerational synthesis,' or synthesis across
generations or republics, notwithstanding the discontinuity that
he himself has emphasized. (Ackerman is sometimes viewed as a
"broad originalist, 4 and so presumably the notion of
intergenerational synthesis will have a broad originalist cast to
it.) Thus, Ackerman's account of transformations, to the extent
that it overstates discontinuity, may make it more difficult for
him credibly to develop interpretations that achieve such synthesis than if he had a theory of interpretation that could acknowledge change without casting it as amendment or transformation.
Ackerman criticizes constitutional theories that, instead of
seeing the New Deal as an amendment or transformation, cloak
its creativity in the "myth of rediscovery"-the myth that the Supreme Court in 1937 and afterward rediscovered the original understanding of the Constitution as contemplated by the Founding
Federalists (pp 10, 259, 279). And he presents such myths as efforts to deny constitutional creativity. Yet Ackerman overlooks
the fact that what generate myths of rediscovery are theories of
originalism, including broad originalist theories like his own. For
originalists, both narrow and broad, believe that the only way to
be faithful to the Constitution is to follow or translate original
Ackerman, Foundations at 131-62 (cited in note 1) (advancing the idea of
"intergenerational synthesis" and indicating that he will provide particular interpretations in these terms in the projected Volume III, Interpretations).
' For examples of interpretations of Ackerman's work as an attempt to develop a
broad form of originalism, see Laura Kalman, Border Patrol. Reflections on the Turn to
History in Legal Scholarship,66 Fordham L Rev 87, 93-94, 97 (1997); Michael C. Dorf, IntegratingNormative and DescriptiveConstitutionalTheory: The Case of OriginalMeaning,
85 Georgetown L J 1765, 1774-83 (1997); Fleming, 65 Fordham L Rev at 1337-38, 1344-55
(cited in note 47); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite"in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum L Rev 523, 579-90 (1995); Fleming, 11 Const Comm at 369-70 (cited in note
3); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 Harv L Rev 918, 933-34 (1992);
Michelman, 97 Yale L J at 1521-23 (cited in note 38).
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meaning or original understanding,75 and to that extent to deny
creativity in interpreting it.
As long as Ackerman conceives interpretation in terms of
some form of broad originalism, he is likely, when he attempts to
develop interpretations that attain intergenerational syntheses,
to provide some of his own myths of rediscovery. The proof of this
suggestion lies in the fact that some of Ackerman's acolytes, notably Lawrence Lessig, have been driven by their quests for forms
of broad originalism to develop accounts of fidelity as translation,
as opposed to accounts of constitutional transformation: Lessig's
account of the New Deal deradicalizes Ackerman's account of the
creativity of transformation in favor of a quest for fidelity in
translation of original meaning, which amounts to a sophisticated
myth of rediscovery.76 The best way to avoid the tendency to
propagate myths of rediscovery is to eschew originalism, both
narrow and broad, in favor of a theory of interpretation that conceives fidelity to the Constitution as integrity with the moral
reading of the Constitution. Such a theory can acknowledge
change in interpretation without needing to dress it up in the
garb of translations of original meaning or transformations of
popular sovereignty.
CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO YALE

In concluding, I return to the puzzle that I posed in the introduction: How is it possible that Ackerman could believe it necessary to develop his theory of constitutional amendment and
transformation outside Article V in order to realize "the possibility of popular sovereignty" and "the possibility of interpretation"?
The difficulties with Ackerman's dualism-which underlie the
problems with these two claims-are difficulties in his conceptions of democracy and interpretation, respectively. The root difficulties in Ackerman's conceptions bear deep affinities to those in
the ideas of his former Yale colleague, Bickel (not to mention
those in the work of his current Yale colleague, Amar77 ).
" See Fleming, 65 Fordham L Rev at 1336-38 (cited in note 47) (criticizing both narrow originalist and broad originalist understandings of the idea of fidelity in constitutional
interpretation).
78 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 Fordhamn L Rev 1365
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChangedReadings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan
L Rev 395 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex L Rev 1165 (1993).
Ackerman criticizes Lessig's "legalist" account of the New Deal-which addresses the
question in terms of translation rather than transformation-for playing into the "reigning professional narrative," part of which is the "myth of rediscovery" (pp 290, 477 n 26).
" Both Ackerman and Amar attempt either to dissolve or to resolve the "countermajoritarian difficulty" through offering theories of democracy grounded in popular sover-
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In recent years, some constitutional scholars have noted the
emergence of a "Yale school" of constitutional theory, by which
they refer to Ackerman's and Amar's theories of amending the
Constitution outside Article V."s But these theories are simply the
latest symptom or manifestation of deeper difficulties in conceptions of democracy and interpretation that have plagued Yale
constitutional theorists since Bickel. By the formulation "the
Constitution goes to Yale," I mean to suggest that Yale seems to
foster or generate constitutional theories that are haunted or
hobbled by the root difficulties of Bickels theory, which were reflected in his formulation of and response to the "countermajoritarian difficulty." The first difficulty was that Bickel held
an impoverished conception of democracy as majoritarian representative democracy, within which not only judicial review but
even fundamental rights were deviant and anomalous rather
than integral.79 The second was that Bickel held an impoverished
conception of interpretation. He rejected the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, and sought to develop a
"noninterpretive" justification grounded in preserving fundamental values.80 Yet he proved incapable of articulating a post-realist
conception of interpretation that could withstand skeptical and
democratic objections to every conceivable source of fundamental
values."' Thus, his quest for a source of fundamental valueswhich Ely aptly called the "odyssey of Alexander Bickel-became
a nightmarish free-fall.'2
eignty whereby We the People may amend the Constitution outside Article V. In different
ways, both Ackerman and Amar level the Constitution and along with it the idea of popular sovereignty. Ackerman's conception of popular sovereignty leads him to supplement
Article V with sustained super-monism, whereby We the People must be free to amend the
Constitution through sustained popular movements. Amar levels the Constitution further,
by advancing a majoritarian conception of popular sovereignty that supplements Article V
by allowing amendment of the Constitution through majoritarian national referenda. See
Amar, 94 Colum L Rev 457 (cited in note 6); Amar, 55 U Chi L Rev 1043 (cited in note 8).
" See; for example, Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 Harv L Rev 1221, 1246
(1995).
"See Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch at 16-18 (cited in note 7).
Id at 1-28.
81See Ely, Democracy and Distrustat 43-72 (cited in note 29) (criticizing "noninterpretivist" theories of "discovering fundamental values," including Bickel's theory, on the
ground that they are vulnerable to skeptical and democratic objections). For an analysis of
Bickel's work in relation to the quest for a "post-realist Constitution," see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-RealistConstitution, 11 Harv CR-CL L Rev 521
(1976).
Ely, Democracy and Distrustat 71-72 (cited in note 29). In referring to Bickers odyssey as "nightmarish," I mean to echo Hart's notion of the "nightmare" of judges never
finding, but always only making, law. See Hart, The Nightmare and the Noble Dream at
126 (cited in note 35).
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Ackerman began Discovering the Constitution-which
launched the We the People project in 1984-by claiming that he
would "rediscover the Constitution" and dissolve the "countermajoritarian difficulty" that haunted Bickel by reclaiming or reconstructing the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review.' That certainly was a promising beginning. And one might
well have believed that Ackerman had the tools to rescue constitutional theory from the difficulties in, and brought on by,
Bickers work. For one thing, Ackerman's understanding of democracy as dualist is richer than Bickers. For another, Ackerman's understanding of interpretation as "constructive" is more
sophisticated than Bickers, and it is staunchly post-realist." All
in all, Ackerman is far more sophisticated than Bickel in what
the latter called "the method of reason familiar to the discourse of
moral philosophy.' 8
But Ackerman is hobbled by the quest for "the possibility of
popular sovereignty," just as Bickel was haunted by the "countermajoritarian difficulty." Accordingly, Ackerman develops a theory
of democracy that reduces or recasts our Constitution and constitutional democracy into the mold of popular sovereignty, just as
Bickel rejected as deviant any feature of our constitutional
scheme that did not conform to a theory of majoritarian representative democracy. (Amar is either the synthetic culmination or
the reductio ad absurdum of the Yale school, for he fundamentally conceives popular sovereignty as majoritarian representative democracy.) And Ackerman pursues "the possibility of interpretation," whereas Bickel searched for a "noninterpretive" justification of judicial review. This leads Ackerman to develop a pluralist conception of the sources of higher lawmaking outside Article V, just as Bickel searched for a source of fundamental values
outside the Constitution altogether.
As against Ackerman's and Bickers theories, we need a conception of constitutional democracy of the sort I sketched here to
avoid the theoretical hankering to transform our "incorrigible,"
"irreducible" dualist Constitution into the molds of popular sovereignty and majoritarianism. And we need a conception of inter-

Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at 1013-16 (cited in note 19).
See Bruce A. Ackerman, ReconstructingAmerican Law (Harvard 1984). For example, he exhorts us to "have the strength to question the realist banalities of contemporary
legal thought" and to move "beyond realism" (pp 417-19).
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 87 (Yale 1978).
The statement in the text is borne out not only by Ackerman's work in constitutional theory but also by his work in political theory. See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman, Social
Justice in the Liberal State (Yale 1980).
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pretation like Dworkin's to reclaim the dualist justification of judicial review from Ackerman's reconstruction of it and to rescue
the fundamental rights justification of judicial review from
Bickers "noninterpretive" defense of it. Such conceptions offer
hope of preserving and realizing our exceptional, unconventional
Constitution.

